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Dynamex Is Dynamite, but Epic Systems Is
Its Foil – Chamber of Commerce: The Sleeper
in the Trilogy
William B. Gould IV *

I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes about whether individual workers are employees or independent
contractors have emerged with increasing frequency as the twenty-first century
has unfolded. 1 Many of these disputes focus on the so-called “gig economy,”
which is a labor market characterized by the flexibility and the prevalence of
short-term work as opposed to permanent jobs. 2 The Department of Labor
refers to the gig economy phenomenon as providing alternative work arrangements, 3 while Audrey Freedman calls it the “contingent workforce.” 4 In Europe, the gig economy is referred to as “atypical employment.” 5
Though the issue of the dependent laborer – a concept thus far judicially
unrecognized in the United States – was addressed more than a half-century
ago, 6 the definition of what constitutes a gig economy has been described only
Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus, at Stanford Law School, Stanford,
California; Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board (1994–1998); and Chairman of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board (2014–2017). I am grateful
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Law, Business and Policy.
1. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment
in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1683–84, 1688 (2016).
2. See id. at 1684–88. A gig economy is “[r]ooted in an economic model in which
individuals sell service to one another, [and] online platforms help facilitate varied
forms of peer-to-peer work.” Id. at 1684.
3. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONTINGENT AND
ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS – MAY 2017 1 (June 7, 2018),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf.
4. Louis Hyman, Where Are All the Uber Drivers? Not in These Government
Statistics, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oehyman-contingent-temp-workers-20180729-story.html. Audrey Freedman was a labor
economist at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id. She used the term “contingent work”
for the first time in 1985 at a conference on employment security. Id.
5. See Paul Schoukens & Alberto Barrio, The Changing Concept of Work: When
Does Typical Work Become Atypical?, 8 EUR. LAB. L.J. 306, 312 (2017). It is also
known as “crowdwork.” Id. at 317 n.80.
6. See, e.g., H.W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal
Problems of Countervailing Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (1965); see also Marc
Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L.
*
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within the past decade. 7 Traditionally, the gig economy has mostly been associated with chance engagements in a variety of venues for a short duration 8 –
for example, labor lasting only for an evening, a weekend, or a week at clubs,
restaurants, concert halls, shopping centers, open stadiums, and fairgrounds.
Scholars best describe the gig economy as follows:
The term “gig” originated in the music industry, where musicians go
into the studio to record one song or play in a band for one performance.
The musicians with such gigs have no expectation of recording at the
same studio the following day or playing with the same band the following night. Borrowing from the music industry, we define “gig employment” as one-time jobs where workers are employed on a particular
task or for a defined period of time . . . . [A] gig worker is not paid a
wage or salary; does not have an implicit or explicit contract for a continuing work relationship; and does not have a predictable work schedule or predictable earnings when working. Applying this definition,
some sole proprietors, some independent contractors, and anyone who
& POL’Y J. 187 (1999). An earlier discussion of the British law on the subject is contained in O. Kahn-Freund, Notes of Cases, Servants and Independent Contractors, 14
MOD. L. REV. 505 (1951). The Canadian situation is best summed up by Brian A.
Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View
from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7 (1999). See also Judy Fudge et al.,
Changing Boundaries in Employment: Developing a New Platform for Labour Law, 10
CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 329 (2003); Judy Fudge et al., Employee or Independent
Contractor? Charting the Legal Significance of the Distinction in Canada, 10
CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 193 (2003).
Some of the issues relate to relatively affluent professionals as well. See Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights
for “Dependent Contractors”, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 155–60 (2005).
For discussion on the contemporary scene, see Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623 (2017); Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A
Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635 (2017); Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Employed by an Algorithm: Labor Rights in the On-Demand Economy, 40 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 987 (2017); Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and Labor Law, 51 U. S.F. L. REV. 51 (2017) [hereinafter Lobel, Gig Economy & the Future];
Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577 (2016); Miriam A. Cherry, People Analytics and Invisible Labor, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2016); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101
MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016).
7. Gig Economy, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/gig_economy (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) (describing the origin of
“gig economy” as the “[e]arly [twenty-first] century”). The Cambridge English Dictionary defines “gig economy” as “a way of working that is based on people having
temporary jobs or doing separate pieces of work, each paid separately, rather than working for an employer.” Gig Economy, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/gig-economy (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
8. See Lobel, Gig Economy & the Future, supra note 6, at 51–52.
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is a day laborer or on-demand/platform worker should be considered a
gig worker. 9

The description of this concept had its initial inspiration in the practice of
musicians –disproportionately jazz musicians. 10 But members of symphony
often engaged in separate gigs beyond their “regular” work as well. 11 This
Article examines the concept of the independent contractor classification – a
characterization at issue in early litigation involving the question of whether
particular workers are employees or independent contractors. It describes the
early cases arising in transportation, including over-the-road trucking, the taxicab industry, and package delivery companies like Federal Express (“FedEx”).
The Article takes the position that the concept of flexibility, frequently used by
employers to classify or reclassify employees as independent contractors, is a
false justification for determining that employees are independent contractors.
It also takes the position that engaging in part-time work for numerous employers is consistent with a finding of an employment relationship.
The Article focuses upon a “trilogy of cases,” beginning with the Supreme
Court of California’s unanimous, landmark decision in Dynamex Operations
West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 12 which established a presumption
in favor of employee status 13 – a holding that has provoked considerable resistance from the business community. 14 The second case is the United States
Supreme Court’s 5-4 majority decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 15 which
sustained prohibitions against employee class actions by upholding binding individual arbitration clauses – or “unbargained-for” 16 individual arbitration
clauses, as Justice Ruth B. Ginsburg’s powerful dissenting opinion describes

9. KATHARINE G. ABRAHAM ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEASURING THE GIG
ECONOMY: CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND OPEN ISSUES 10 (2017), https://aysps.gsu.edu/files/2016/09/Measuring-the-Gig-Economy-Current-Knowledge-andOpen-Issues.pdf.
10. See Lora Keenan, One Gig at a Time: Contract Lawyers and the New Economy, OR. ST. B. BULL., May 2018, at 16, 18.
11. See Lancaster Symphony Orchestra v. NLRB, 822 F.3d 563, 569–70 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (discussing the capability of symphonic musicians to “gig” with other symphonies in the area and pursue teaching and other musical endeavors while still “gigging” with the orchestra at hand). Cf. ROBERT J. FLANAGAN, THE PERILOUS LIFE OF
SYMPHONY ORCHESTRAS: ARTISTIC TRIUMPHS AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES (2012).
12. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
13. Id. at 40.
14. See generally Memorandum from DoorDash et al. to David M. Lanier, Sec’y
of the Cal. Labor & Workforce Dev. Agency, & Keely Martin Bosler, Cabinet Sec’y to
the Governor (July 23, 2018), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4639019Follow-Up-Letter-to-Secretary-Lanier-Keely.html.
15. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
16. Id. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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them. 17 The Article also discusses the transportation exemption from the
strong pro-individual arbitration strictures of the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925 (“FAA”), 18 an issue recently addressed in United States Supreme Court
in New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira. 19 Finally, the third case, Chamber of Commerce
v. City of Seattle, 20 examines Seattle’s unprecedented ordinance 21 that provided for collective bargaining for for-hire drivers, including taxicab drivers,
as independent contractors and was deemed not to be preempted by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 22 The Article concludes that the court’s
treatment of Seattle’s legislation under antitrust law is questionable but contends that the court’s analysis has nonetheless established a roadmap for state
legislation – an avenue opened more clearly by the court’s conclusion that state
and local governments are not preempted by federal law and have authority to
legislate in this arena. 23

II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS
While traditional employment continues to be the rule rather than the exception, the advent of ride-sharing companies, like Uber and Lyft, as well as
other gig companies, like TaskRabbit and Instacart, has raised concerns that
the gig economy represents a new phenomenon that undercuts traditional employment through exploitation. In 2018, a study conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor reported that the number of workers who are characterized as
independent contractors in today’s workforce had declined since 2005. 24 The
statistics for this category only included workers who were mainly or exclusively independent contractors; 25 thus, the study excluded workers who sup17. Id. at 1632 (majority opinion) (“The policy may be debatable but the law is
clear: Congress has instructed that arbitration agreements like those before us must be
enforced as written.”).
18. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2018)).
19. See 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019). See discussion of Oliveira infra notes 210–13 and
accompanying text.
20. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018).
21. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 (Dec. 14, 2015).
22. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 781, 795 (finding “the Ordinance authorizes a per se antitrust violation” and finding that the ordinance was not preempted).
23. Id.
24. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 6. In May 2017, they note a
6.9% total employment – the largest of any alternative work arrangements – in comparison with 7.4% in February 2005. Id.; see also Ben Casselman, Maybe the Gig
Economy Isn’t Reshaping Work After All, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/07/business/economy/work-gig-economy.html.
25. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 1 (“The measures of . . . alternative employment arrangements[, which includes independent contractors,] apply
only to a person’s sole or main job. For individuals with more than one job, this is the
job in which they usually work the most hours.”).
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plemented their primary income with a second or third job as independent contractors. Because the U.S. Department of Labor report was designed to examine only a worker’s primary work responsibilities, and thus only a general decline in the alternative work arrangements was shown, the report did not provide insight into whether the slight decline was due to an expanding traditional
labor market or to high levels of underreporting by individuals taking on independent contractor work as a secondary source of income. 26
Despite the fact that, according to the U.S. Department of Labor report, the number of workers characterized as full-time independent contractors
has declined in recent years, 27 the issues surrounding the gig economy remain
more pertinent in our society than ever before. Characterization of a worker as
an independent contractor rather than an employee has several important implications. First, it may categorize gig workers as unemployed, therefore painting an erroneous national economic picture based upon flawed data and consequent policy. 28 Second, a worker who is characterized as an independent contractor rather than an employee is excluded from the basic safety net policies
created during the New Deal era of the 1930s – such as the Social Security Act
of 1935 (“SSA”), 29 the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”) 30 or
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) 31 – and further developed during the New Frontier and Great Society eras of the 1960s. 32 These legislative
efforts, originating under President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, were
developed largely in response to perceived widespread unemployment and job
shortages and included measures that were designed to increase the number of

26. See id. at 5–7 (evidencing decrease in three surveyed alterative employment
arrangements since the 2005 study but not speculating on the cause).
27. Id. at 6. As the result of this study, Professors Katz and Kreuger have confessed error. See Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Krueger, Understanding Trends in
Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 25425, 2019); Josh Zumbrun, ‘Gig Economy’ Authors Say Work
Flawed, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 8, 2019).
28. See Mary Dorinda Allard & Anne E. Polivka, Measuring Labor Market Activity Today: Are the Words Work and Job Too Limiting for Surveys?, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Nov. 2018, at 1.
29. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. ch. 7).
30. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2018)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152 (defining “employees” covered under the NLRA and excluding independent contractors).
31. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–04, 206–07, 209–18, 218b, 218c, 219).
32. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (“The term ‘employee’
means an individual employed by an employer” for purposes of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); cf. William B. Gould IV, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act at Fifty:
Ruminations on Past, Present, and Future, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 369 (2014).
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jobs available in the United States, to increase wages, and to decrease the length
of the laborer’s average work week. 33
Under the New Deal, the SSA included provisions providing special assistance to covered workers in the form of unemployment compensation, 34
while the FLSA, in its original form, “set the minimum hourly wage at [twentyfive] cents[] and the maximum workweek at [forty-four] hours” 35 and established overtime hours during which employees must be paid. 36 Although initially the FLSA only applied to a limited scope of industries, the successive
economic and social reform efforts of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon
B. Johnson in the New Frontier and the Great Society eras successfully expanded the scope of the FLSA to encompass a broader range of industries,
therefore allowing more employees to avail themselves of its protections. 37
The NLRA provided covered employees the right to “join together to improve their wages and working conditions, with or without a union.” 38 However, with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 39 the NLRA has reversed extant authority 40 and circumscribed employee rights to a relatively narrow common law definition. 41
However, independent contractors do not enjoy the minimum wage and
maximum hour benefits of the FLSA or the unemployment compensation provisions of the SSA. 42 Some states, however, provide special assistance for the

33. See Philip Harvey, An Analysis of the Principal Strategies That Have Influenced the Development of American Employment and Social Welfare Law During the
20th Century, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 677, 686–98 (2000).
34. Patricia P. Martin & David A. Weaver, Social Security: A Program and Policy
History, Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 66 (Nov. 1, 2005), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n1/v66n1p1.html.
35. Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle
for a Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/flsa1938.htm#1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2018); see also 29 U.S.C. § 206.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 207.
37. Chapter 6: Eras of the New Frontier and the Great Society, 1961–1969, U.S.
DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/dolchp06.htm (last visited
Oct. 30, 2018).
38. Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rightswe-protect/rights/employee-rights (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
39. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C.
ch. 7).
40. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944), superseded by National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2(3), as recognized by Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
41. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258–59 (1968); Darden, 503 U.S.
at 324–25. The common law criteria apply to the definition of employer as well.
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
42. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. ch. 7).
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self-employed and therefore in some instances gig workers. 43 In addition,
workers classified as independent contractors do not fall within the covered
scope of the anti-discrimination legislation prohibiting discriminatory conduct
on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, sexual orientation and age 44
or the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 45 and comparable statutes at the
state level providing an employee with time off without pay. 46
Independent contractors constitute a sort of precariat class, which includes those working in part-time or unscheduled jobs. In contrast to traditional jobs, independent contractor jobs frequently have a foreseeable expiration date. Benefits more likely available in the private sector to traditional employees, such as health care, sick pay, and vacations, are generally unavailable
to the gig economy workforce. However, “The effects of growing inequality
and loss of worker power are shared by workers in the standard and nonstandard jobs alike – stagnant wages, lack of access to workplace benefits, insufficient hours, wage theft, retaliation when trying to organize.” 47 It is thought
that this second tier of the workforce is responsible for static wage growth in
the midst of a full employment economy, which has been present since at least
2014. 48
New, successful rideshare companies, like Uber and Lyft, have undercut
the taxicab industry, which already had their drivers characterized as independent contractors. Ridesharing companies have been more lightly regulated than
taxicabs in multiple ways. First, greater latitude is accorded to ridesharing
companies in the hiring of drivers. 49 Second, ridesharing companies are not
42. See Andrew L. Yarrow, Opinion, Update Labor Laws to Meet Needs of ‘Gig’
Economy, S.F. CHRON. (June 10, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Update-labor-laws-to-meet-needs-of-gig-12981182.php (“Nine states
have started . . . Self-Employment Assistance programs.”).
43. Id.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
45. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–6387; 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611–2619, 2631–
2636, 2651–2654).
46. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 398–4 (West 2018).
47. Annette Bernhardt, Making Sense of the New Government Data on Contingent
Work, U.C. BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (June 10, 2018), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/making-sense-new-government-data-contingent-work/.
48. See Phillip Monar, How Much Does the Gig Economy Pay? It’s Complicated,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/economy/sd-fi-labor-day-gig-20170705-story.html (“Estimates for how much
someone can make in the gig economy vary wildly but there is typically one constant
– pay is pretty low.”). For an extensive discussion of the relationship to labor unions
see Workers of the World, Log On! Technology May Help to Revive Organised Labor,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2018, at 23; cf. SARAH KESSLER, GIGGED: THE END OF THE JOB
AND THE FUTURE OF WORK (2018).
49. See Checker Cab Operators, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 899 F.3d 908, 914 (11th
Cir. 2018) (claiming “disparate regulatory frameworks,” taxicab license holders
brought this list of treatment as a show of evidence). Cf. Joe Sanfelippo Cabs, Inc. v.
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subject to hefty insurance coverage requirements. 50 Third, ridesharing companies are permitted to conduct their own independent background checks, while
taxicab companies must conduct greater background checks of its drivers. 51
Fourth, ridesharing vehicles are not required to undergo vehicle inspections. 52
Fifth, taxicabs have been “bound by more onerous vehicle-appearance standards.” 53 And sixth, there have been maximum fare rates established for taxicabs but not for ridesharing. 54 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of this two-tier regulation, which has
given advantages to ridesharing. 55
The well-chronicled consequences of unregulated ridesharing in New
York City highlight the fact that these differences are hardly ephemeral but
rather are more consequential. Reputable studies have established that the
wages of ridesharing and taxicab drivers, when one deducts all expenses associated with running an automobile, do not amount to enough to for the drivers
to afford even a modest lifestyle in New York City. 56 In the case of ridesharing
drivers,
Nine out of [ten] drivers are immigrants and approximately [fifty-four]
percent are responsible for providing more than half of their family incomes. Beyond that, . . . the number of drivers for ride-hailing services

City of Milwaukee, 839 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2016); Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of
Chicago, 839 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Beginning in the 1970s a deregulation
movement swept the country, powered by the belief that competition is often superior
to alternative regulation. Entire agencies vanished, such as the Civil Aeronautics
Board, which had greatly limited competition in the airline industry. Many cities loosened the regulatory limitation on taxi services—and this well before there were any
[Transportation Network Providers (“TNPs”)] . . . . The deregulation movement has
surged with the advent of the TNPs. Chicago, like Milwaukee in [the] companion Sanfelippo case, has chosen the side of deregulation, and thus of competition, over preserving the traditional taxicab monopolies. That is a legally permissible choice.”).
50. Checker Cab Operators, Inc., 899 F.3d at 914.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 924.
56. See Ginia Bellafante, Uber and the False Hopes of the Sharing Economy, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/nyregion/uber-nyc-votedrivers-ride-sharing.html (“[N]early two thirds of drivers who worked for ride-hailing
services did so full time. They held no other jobs; approximately [eighty] percent
bought cars for the purpose of making a living by driving them. Many were in debt
from those acquisitions and making very little money.”); Winnie Hu, Taxi Medallions,
Once a Safe Investment, Now Drag Owners into Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017).
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grew [ten] times faster than the rate of blue-collar employment[] or employment in the city overall. The gig, in effect, was the lifeline and the
lifeline was insufficient. 57

The outlook is even bleaker for taxicab drivers. In New York City, the
lifeline was so insufficient that within a period of six months, six drivers committed suicide, causing the unions, which purport to represent their interests, to
decry “widespread exploitation.” 58 The decline in profitability in the taxicab
industry is so pervasive that, in 2018, taxi medallions that were once valued at
over $1 million dropped to a value as low as $175,000. 59
There have been two major responses to all of this by the state governments. The first is a legislative response, as showcased through the Seattle
ordinance discussed Chamber of Commerce below. 60 The second and more
recent response is New York City’s decision not only to curb the growth of
ridesharing cars but also to establish a minimum wage of $17.22 after expenses
are established for drivers. 61 Defenders of the status quo, however, have protested the “burden of the loss of independent contractor’s status which . . . costs
only [sixty-six] cents on the dollar for every hour worked for a full-time employee.” 62
57. Bellafante, supra note 56.
58. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York Are Struggling. So Are Uber

Drivers., N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/nyregion/uber-taxi-drivers-struggle.html; cf. Holly Honderich, Will S.F.’s Reforms Save
Troubled Taxi Industry?, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 13, 2018) (describing taxicab driver issues
in San Francisco).
59. Id. A taxi medallion is a mechanism that New York City used to restrict the
number of cabs in business. Joe Nocera, The Taxicab Bubble Couldn’t Last Forever,
BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-19/uber-taxi-medallions-and-new-york-city-s-cab-bubble. Drivers are
required to buy a medallion in order to own a cab. Id.
60. See infra Section III.B.3.
61. See Glenn Fleishman, New York Freezes Ride-Sharing Vehicles, Orders Minimum Wage for Uber, Lyft Drivers, FORTUNE (Aug. 8, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/08/08/new-york-freeze-ride-sharing-vehicles-minimum-wage-lyftuber/ (“The regulation didn’t specify a dollar amount, but a report presented to the city’s
Taxi and Limousine Commission . . . suggested $17.22 an hour, which would be $15
plus the overhead costs of operating a vehicle.”).
62. IAN ADAMS & BRIAN JENCUNAS, R STREET, ECONOMIC COSTS AND POLICY
ALTERNATIVES
TO
CALIFORNIA’S
DYNAMEX
DECISION
3
(2018),
https://2o9ub0417chl2lg6m43em6psi2i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/145.pdf; see also ROBERT HABANS, UCLA INST. FOR RES. ON LAB. AND
EMPLOYMENT, EXPLORING THE COSTS OF CLASSIFYING WORKERS AS INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS: FOUR ILLUSTRATIVE SECTORS 1 (2015), http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IndependentContractorCost_20151209.pdf
(“For the scenarios presented here, independent contractor status saves business between [twenty-nine] and [thirty-nine] cents for every dollar of pay – possibly more for
certain classes of construction workers.”).
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What else or what more can be done? As Ginia Bellafante, a New York
Times journalist, said, “What is astonishing about the current legislation is how
tepid much of it actually is and how ferociously it was fought by the companies
involved.” 63 Both Dynamex and the legislative responses of Seattle and New
York City constitute reasonable first steps to address the above noted rampant
abuses promoted through the two-tier worker categorization of the gig economy. 64

III. LITIGATION RELATED TO THE EMPLOYEE-INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR STATUS
Knowing how the law has evolved and developed on the question of status in the workplace is important to understanding the current debate. Section
A of this Part details the early cases that attempted to differentiate between
employees and independent contractors. Section B examines a trilogy of recent
cases that revisit this important question.

A. The Early Cases – A Conflict of Interpretation
The economic reality that independent contractor jobs are, in part, responsible for stagnancy in wages present among the traditional workforce accounts
for the host of litigation that has emerged in state courts across the nation, particularly in California, 65 over whether workers are independent contractors or
employees. The actions are usually brought in state courts or before the California Labor Commissioner by workers seeking recovery for minimum wage
loss and overtime protection. 66 State law, which is – for the most part – predicated upon the restrictive common law criteria for defining “employee,” has

63. Bellafante, supra note 56.
64. See generally John Herzfeld, NYC Council Advances Bills Protecting Taxi,

Ride-Hailing Drivers, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.bna.com/nyccouncil-advances-n57982093868/ (describing the most recent legislative initiatives in
New York City); cf. Pippa Crerar, Gig Economy Workers’ Rights to be Given Boost in
Overhaul, GUARDIAN, Nov. 8, 2018 (describing initiatives undertaken in Great Britain).
65. California is now the world’s fifth-largest economy, surpassing that of the
United Kingdom. Jonathan J. Cooper, California Now World’s 5th Largest Economy,
Surpassing UK, USA TODAY (May 5, 2018, 1:29 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/05/05/california-now-worlds-5th-largest-economy-beating-out-uk/583508002/.
66. See also, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015);
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *1 (Cal. Dept. Lab.
June 3, 2015). See generally William B. Gould IV, The Future of the Gig Economy,
Labor Law, and the Role of Unions: How Will They Look Going Forward?, in
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 70TH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 2017: THE NEW
WORLD OF WORK, 112–13 (2017).
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produced uncertainty, lengthy litigation, 67 and relief in the form of damages
and attorneys’ fees and costs.
In cases involving the right to organize under the NLRA, the National
Labor Relations Board ( “NLRB”) has defined what constitutes an employee 68
and has determined that taxicab drivers are independent contractors and thus,
as a practical matter, fall outside the protection of the NLRA, even though the
industry is within its jurisdiction. 69 In the 1990s, the NLRB interpreted the
NLRA to include some truck drivers as employees. 70 However, the NLRB
continued to classify some truckers as independent contractors. 71 It is now ever
more apparent that the increased use of independent contractors in trucking has
produced enormous inequality:
Many truck drivers are paid on a per-mile basis, which means that some
earn less than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour. The economics of trucking can be bleaker still for drivers who are classified as
independent contractors. Some even wind up owing trucking companies money because a truck lease, insurance, fuel and other expenses
can add up to more than their per-mile reimbursement rate . . . . 72
Dominic Oliveira has firsthand experience with this problem . . . [as he]
work[ed] for New Prime . . . in 2013 and 2014 [and spent] much of that
time as an independent contractor. Some weeks he owed the company
. . . money after driving more than 1,000 miles. He made so little that
he could not always afford rent and he spent long stretches – six months,
67. The difficulties and limitations involved in this litigation have been chronicled
in V.B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassification Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739 (2017);
see also Martin H. Malin, Protecting Platform Workers in the Gig Economy: Look to
the FTC, 51 IND. L. REV. 377 (2018).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2018).
69. See sources cited infra note 71.
70. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 854 (1998) (concluding that
pick-up and delivery drivers are employees under the NLRA and not independent contractors) (Chairman Gould, concurring).
71. Dial-a-Mattress, 326 N.L.R.B. 884, 894–95 (1998) (Chairman Gould, dissenting). Earlier, the NLRB and the courts had impeded trade union organizing in the taxicab industry by virtue of their conclusion that taxicab drivers were frequently independent contractors. The leading cases here are NLRB v. Associated Diamond Cabs,
702 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1983); Local 777, Democratic Union Org. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d
862 (D.C. Cir. 1978); and Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
See also Veena Dubal, The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work, Regulation,
& Labor Advocacy in San Francisco’s Taxi and Uber Economies, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 73 (2017) and Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur? Contesting the
Dualism of Legal Worker Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 65 (2017). But see NLRB v.
Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008); City Cab Co. of Orlando, Inc. v.
NLRB, 628 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
72. Opinion, The Trouble with Trucking, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/11/opinion/sunday/the-trouble-with-trucking.html.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 9

1000

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

at one point – living out of his truck. Mr. Oliveira’s contract said he
was free to drive for other trucking companies but there were numerous
conditions that bound him to New Prime. 73

Meanwhile, the plot thickened, as the independent contractor-employee
dispute spread to the product packaging industry. Most of the litigation leading
up to 2018 has involved FedEx workers who had some measure of autonomy
in deciding the speed and order in which their work was performed. 74 In the
final analysis, courts have held that the company required work in a particular
time period and that the FedEx workers should have been properly regarded as
employees. 75 In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 76 however, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the NLRB and held that
FedEx drivers were independent contractors inasmuch as they could operate
routes, hire additional drivers and helpers, and sell routes without permission. 77
In so reversing, the District of Columbia Circuit endorsed the view that the
NLRB did not possess the “special administrative expertise” in the NLRA
cases that normally applies. 78 In so reasoning, the District of Columbia Circuit
ignored the United States Supreme Court’s admonition that the NLRB’s position should not be reversed where it involves a “choice between two fairly conflicting views.” 79 The court focused on the level of entrepreneurial opportunity
73. Id.; see also New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019). This is a
phenomenon that Steve Viscelli, a sociologist at the University of Pennsylvania, detailed in his 2016 book, STEVE VISCELLI, THE BIG RIG: TRUCKING AND THE DECLINE OF
THE AMERICAN DREAM (2016).
74. See Gould, supra note 66, at passim.
75. Id. at 101–02.
76. 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) [hereinafter FedEx I].
77. See id. at 504.
78. See id. at 496 (quoting N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB., 869 F.2d 596, 598
(D.C. Cir. 1989)); see also FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) [hereinafter FedEx II] (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260
(1968)) (“[T]he question whether a worker is an ‘employee’ or ‘independent contractor’ under [NLRA] is a question of ‘pure’ common-law agency principles ‘involv[ing]
no special administrative expertise that a court does not possess.’”). The court of appeals in FedEx II held that, given the United States Supreme Court’s finding that no
special administrative expertise was involved in these cases, “this particular question
under the [NLRA] is not one to which we grant the [NLRB] Chevron deference . . . .”
FedEx II, 849 F.3d at 1128; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“If [a] statue is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”).
79. FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 496 (quoting C.C. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858
(D.C. Cir. 1995)); see also United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968). Over time, the
Court has established a set of standards for interpreting the NLRA. See, e.g., Holly
Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398–99 (1996) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843) (“If a statute’s meaning is plain, the [NLRB] and reviewing courts ‘must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”); NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 93–94 (1995) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S.
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as the dominant factor to consider when making a determination that a worker
is an independent contractor. 80 Chief Judge Merrick B. Garland’s well-reasoned dissent instead stressed the role that control and the essential nature of
the work performed to the employer’s business play in the analysis and expressed fidelity to the standard of deference mandated by the United States
Supreme Court. 81

883, 891 (1984)) (“[W]hen reviewing the [the NLRB]’s interpretation of the term ‘employee’ as it is used in [the NLRA], we have repeatedly said that ‘[s]ince the task of
defining the term employee is one that has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the [NLRA], . . . the [NLRB]’s construction of that
term is entitled to considerable deference . . . .”); Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891; Charles
D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 409 (1982) (“Congress’ refusal
to intervene indicated that it intended to leave to the [NLRB’s] specialized judgment
the resolution of conflicts between union and employer rights that were bound to arise
in multiemployer bargaining.”); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979)
(“Of course, the judgment of the [NLRB] is subject to judicial review; but if its construction of the statue is reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected merely because
the court might prefer another view.”); Beth Isr. Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501
(1978) (“The judicial role is narrow: The rule which the [NLRB] adopts is judicially
reviewable for consistency with the Act, and for rationality, but if it satisfies those criteria, the [NLRB’s] application of the rule, if supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole, must be enforced.”); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No.
449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (“The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress
committed primarily to the [NLRB], subject to limited judicial review.”).
80. FedEx I, 563 U.S. at 504 (“Because the indicia favoring a finding the contractors are employees are clearly outweighed by evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity,
the [NLRB] cannot be said to have made a choice between two fairly conflicting
views.”). This ruling seems to be ignored in FedEx II. FedEx II, 849 F.3d at 1128
(“[T]his particular question under [NLRA] is not one to which we grant the Board
Chevron deference . . . .”). Of course, Chevron invokes the standards which the United
States Supreme Court established for the NLRA itself in cases alluded to above. See
sources cited supra note 79. The NLRB General Counsel has taken the position that
misclassification is not inherently unfair labor practice. Memorandum from Jayme L.
Sophir, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. to John J. Walsh, Jr., Reg’l
Dir., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458275a5e9. However, an administrative law judge has held to the
contrary. Velox Express, Inc. & Jeannie Edge, Case 15-CA-184006, 2017 WL
4278501 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 25, 2017) (“Thus, where it is a ‘close call,’ agencies and
courts should err on the side on finding employee status.”).
81. See FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 504–19 (Garland, J., dissenting). Judge Garland protested the majority’s almost exclusive reliance upon the entrepreneurial opportunity as
a basis for concluding that the drivers were independent contractors and noted that there
was not an actual single instance of such opportunity. Id. at 507. Judge Garland said,
“It is not unreasonable for the NLRB to take the position that a material number of
workers must actually take advantage of an opportunity before it will conclude that the
opportunity is significant and realistic rather than insubstantial and theoretical.” Id. at
517.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 9

1002

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Curiously, in 2016, the very same court appeared to adopt the position
established in Judge Garland’s dissent in its decision of Lancaster Symphony
Orchestra v. NLRB. 82 The Lancaster Symphony Orchestra case involved musicians employed on a regular basis by the Lancaster Symphony. 83 Ordinarily,
the musicians in question did not hire someone to serve in their place, although
they were obliged to find replacements for last-minute cancellations. 84 The
District of Columbia Circuit noted that even though the musicians were able to
back out of a series of programs and play for a higher-paying “gig” with another symphony, the entrepreneurial opportunity was “limited” and provided
“miniscule support” for the conclusion that they were independent contractors. 85 The court stated that
[u]nlike FedEx drivers, the Orchestra’s musicians – even with their ability to back out of a concert in order to take advantage of a more profitable gig – can increase their income only by accepting jobs with other
employers. Were this quite minor entrepreneurial opportunity given
much weight, it might lead to almost automatic classification of many
Similarly, Judge Fletcher for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has said, “There is no indication that California has replaced its longstanding right-tocontrol test with the new entrepreneurial-opportunities test developed by the D.C. Circuit.” Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc, 765 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir.
2014).
I have long been of the view that the control attributable to government regulation is irrelevant and should not be distinguished from employer control. As I said,
I would reverse current [NLRB] precedent and find that controls mandated by
Governmental regulation should be considered probative of an employer-employee relationship.
. . . [C]ontrols placed by the employer upon workers are indicative of an employment relationship, regardless of whether the employer imposes the controls
because of [g]overnment regulation or for independent business reasons.
....
It is true that the [g]overnment is the source of the regulations and that the
carriers have no choice but to impose the regulations if they wish to do business.
However, it is also true that the [g]overnment does not directly interact with the
drivers or owner-operators.
....
[T]hat, in my view, is the heart of the matter. To the extent that the [g]overnment sets regulations, it relies on the carriers to impose and enforce them. The
only “face” the drivers see is that of the carrier, not the [g]overnment. The
reality of such a situation is that of an employment relationship where the carrier
has significant control over the drivers’ job performance.

Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 NLRB 842, 854–55 (1998) (Chairman Gould, concurring).
82. 822 F.3d 563 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
83. Id. at 564.
84. Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 822 F.3d at 569.
85. Id. at 570.
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part-time workers as contractors. Yet as the [NLRB] explained, “[p]arttime and casual employees covered by the [NLRA] often work for more
than one employer. 86

This Article argues that Lancaster Symphony Orchestra is at odds with
portions of the court’s reasoning in FedEx Home Delivery, given that the latter
gave weight almost exclusively to the entrepreneurial opportunity. As noted,
Lancaster Symphony Orchestra allows for entrepreneurial opportunities that
might exist through a “gig” with another employer. This is a theme that
emerges anew in some of the ridesharing cases involving Uber and Lyft. 87 The
fact is that many casual or part-time employees are similarly situated to musicians in Lancaster Symphony Orchestra and will work for a number of employers. The District of Columbia Circuit noted this critical point in Lancaster
Symphony Orchestra, where it affirmed the NLRB’s conclusion and held that
the exclusion of workers as employees on the ground that they are part-time or
casual is inconsistent with the NLRA’s coverage. 88
Moreover, the idea of a “prohibition on moonlighting” is unknown today
– indeed, even the word itself is strange to most millennials. The term moonlighting was taken from the practice of working a second job by the light of the
moon, which – a half century ago – was regarded as irregular. 89 For instance,
when employers unsuccessfully sought to exclude “salt” employees – persons
getting a job at a specific workplace with the intent of organizing a union –
from their workforce, they did not contend that a policy against “serving two
masters” applied to other employers besides unions. 90 This is because the practice of employment with more than one employer has become widespread,

86. Id. (citing Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 357 NLRB 1761, 1765 (2011)).
87. In the ridesharing context, control is more sophisticated and autonomy in terms

of schedules and ability to work elsewhere substantial. See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.,
60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Gould supra note 66, at 90; see also Noam
Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html.
88. Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 822 F.3d at 565, 570.
89. See Moonlight, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moonlight (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
90. Here the union acted as an employer because the union employed “salts” to
organize employers. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 96 (1995);
see also, e.g., Architectural Glass & Metal Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.3d 426, 432–33 (6th
Cir. 1997) (an employer may lawfully adopt neutral policy against moonlighting if there
is no discriminatory intent against the union); Tualatin Elec., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1237,
1237, 1241 (1995) (holding that employer’s no-moonlighting policy violated NLRA
because it was enacted to avoid hiring salts). Arbitration decisions from the 1950s and
1960s have established the principle that moonlighting itself is not just cause for discharge short of the moonlighting employee negatively affecting the business interests
of the primary employer. See, e.g., Firestone Retread Shop, 38 BNA LA 600, 601
(1962); Janitorial Serv., Inc., 33 LA 902, 908–09 (BNA 1959).
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moving beyond the traditional “moonlighting” practice that employers attempted to prohibit based on concerns that employees were not well-rested.
Because of the demise of such employer practices, the phenomenon of
working for more than one employer cannot be viewed as dispositive on the
employee-independent contractor issue. Flexibility in hours is something frequently associated with employee status as well as independent contractor status. This point was duly noted by both the NLRB and the District of Columbia
Circuit in Lancaster Symphony Orchestra. 91 A fundamental problem with the
early case law was that its reference to numerous criteria – such as entrepreneurial opportunity and flexibility in hours – lacked clarity that the parties
could rely upon and provided an opportunity for judicial predilections. As a
result of these cases, it became clear that the criteria should (1) be simplified
to be more easily understandable and to act as guidance and (2) promote protection for workers in trucking, ridesharing, and elsewhere who are exposed to
bad working conditions that promote inequality. The problem with the NLRA,
however, is that its Taft-Hartley legislative history has locked labor and management into the more numerous and thus imprecise common law standards. 92

B. The 2018 Independent Contractor-Employee Trilogy
In early 2018, the federal and state courts handed down several decisions
that will have a major impact upon the independent contractor-employee legal
arena. The first of them, Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 93 decided by the Supreme Court of California, provided
a strong framework for determining whether drivers are independent contractors or employees and also provided a favorable ruling on the question of
whether workers wishing to challenge their status can do so through class action litigation. 94 In the second ruling, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 95 the
United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that binding arbitration
agreements mandating that all employees waive their ability to utilize class actions in disputes with their employers – a tactic that has been frequently used
in employment contracts 96 – are enforceable under the FAA; 97 however, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, characterized this tactic as “unbargained-for.” 98
The third ruling, Chamber of Commerce v. Seattle, 99 which arose in Washington, involved the question of whether legislation enacted at the municipal level

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 822 F.3d at 568.
See supra notes 39–41.
416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
See generally id.
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
Id. at 1634.
Id. at 1624–29.
Id. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018).
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that “authorize[d] a collective-bargaining process” between ridesharing companies, such as Uber and Lyft, and independent contractors who worked for
those companies as drivers could stand in light of both federal antitrust law and
labor law standards set forth by the NLRA. 100
It is difficult to estimate which of these decisions is the most important;
but because Dynamex was heard by the Supreme Court of California and Epic
Systems was heard by the United States Supreme Court, both have the potential
to be lasting. The Supreme Court of California ruling was significant because,
unless eviscerated by special interest political pressure in 2019 and beyond, it
will result in a major, positive transformation of many employment relationships within California – which has the fifth largest economy in the world – by
allowing drivers to challenge their status as independent contractors as a class
rather than as individuals. 101
But the United States Supreme Court’s Epic Systems decision takes much
of this positive impact of Dynamex away, except possibly in some aspects of
transportation, as developed below. 102 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Chamber of Commerce, while interpreting antitrust law in a manner
that accepts the essential contention of the new ridesharing companies – i.e.,
that there are new sectors of the economy not contemplated or addressed by
existing state statutes 103 – nonetheless paves the way for state regulation of independent contractors who are not characterized as employees through rejection of NLRA preemption. The preemption doctrine strips jurisdiction from
the states and provides a roadmap under federal antitrust law. Under the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion, however analytically flawed, the way is open for the new
legislation by states that wish to promote collective bargaining in the independent contractor arena.

1. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of the Los Angeles County
In Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of the Los Angeles
County, 104 the first of these three groundbreaking decisions, Chief Justice Tani
G. Cantil-Sakauye, writing for a unanimous court, held that, in the California
wage order context, a worker will be presumed to be an employee rather than
an independent contractor unless the business meets several criteria proving
otherwise, known as the “ABC” test. 105
Dynamex is a nationwide, same-day courier service that operates a number of business centers in California and has large corporate customers, such
100.
101.
102.
103.

2018).

Id. at 775–76.
Cooper, supra note 65.
See infra Section III.B.2.
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 784–85 (9th Cir.

104. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
105. See generally id.
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as Office Depot and Home Depot. 106 Drivers were converted into independent
contractors in order to generate economic savings; thus, drivers were “required
to provide their own vehicles and pay for all their own transportation expenses,
including fuel, tolls, vehicle maintenance, and vehicle liability insurance, as
well as all taxes and workers’ compensation insurance.” 107 The ultimate issue
before the court was whether the classification of the drivers as independent
contractors violated California wage orders related to California minimum
wages and overtime pay, as well as unlawful business practices under state
law. 108
In Dynamex, “two individual delivery drivers, suing on their own behalf”
as well as a class of similarly situated drivers in one action, protested their
classification as independent contractors. 109 The “[d]rivers of Dynamex [were]
generally free to set their own schedule but [had to] notify” the company a
number of days in advance. 110 The drivers paid for a cellular telephone to contact Dynamex. 111 The drivers were assigned deliveries by the dispatchers at
Dynamex’s sole discretion and had no guarantee on the number and type of
deliveries they would be offered. 112 The drivers could choose the sequence by
which they made deliveries, however, like FedEx drivers, they were required
to make the delivery on the day of assignment. 113
The Supreme Court of California premised its discussion by noting that,
in some circumstances, “classification as an independent contractor [could] be
advantageous to [a] worker[] as well as to [an employer] . . . . 114 The court
stated that
the risk that workers who should be treated as employees may be improperly misclassified as independent contractors is significant in light
of the potentially substantial economic incentives that a business may
have in mischaracterizing some workers as independent contractors.
Such incentives include the unfair competitive advantage the business
may obtain over competitors that properly classify similar workers as
employees and that thereby assume the fiscal and other responsibilities
and burdens that an employer owes to its employees. In recent years,
the relevant regulatory agencies of both the federal and state governments have declared that the misclassification of workers as independent contractors rather than employees is a very serious problem, depriving federal and state governments of billions of dollars in tax revenue

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 5, 9.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 5.
Id.
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and millions of workers of the labor law protections to which they are
entitled. 115

As a preliminary matter, the court was asked to determine whether the
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations 116 decision –
Supreme Court of California precedent that was long characterized within the
state as “embodying the common law test or standard for distinguishing employees and independent contractors” – was the only appropriate “standard”
under California law for resolving the independent contractor issue. 117 In Dynamex, the court determined that the preexisting Borello approach regarding
employees and independent contractors focused primarily upon the scope and
purpose of the particular statutory scheme involved and was not “limited by
common law principles,” as the Borello court had once stated. 118
In Dynamex, the Supreme Court of California adopted the “suffer or permit to work” definition of the employee for the purposes of state law, 119 which
is a more expansive approach to coverage principally associated at the national
level with the cases addressing the FLSA. 120 In Dynamex, the court held that
the “suffer or permit to work standard is relevant and significant in assessing
the scope of the category of workers that the wage order was intended to protect.” 121 Accordingly, the court explained that the “suffer or permit to work”
standard allows the exclusion of a worker as an independent contractor only if
the worker is the type of traditional independent contractor – such as an
independent plumber or electrician – who would not reasonably have
been viewed as working in the hiring business. Such an individual
would have been realistically understood . . . as working only in his or
her own independent business.
The federal courts, in applying the suffer or permit to work standard set
forth in the FLSA, have recognized that the standard was intended to be
broader and more inclusive than the preexisting common law test for
distinguishing employees from independent contractors, but at the same
time, does not purport to render every individual worker an employee
rather than an independent contractor. 122

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 19, 25 (citation omitted).
Id. at 19 (italics omitted) (quoting S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc., 769 P.2d at 405).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 30. This is why the “suffer or permit to work” standard in California
wage orders “finds its justification in the fundamental purposes and necessity of the
minimum wage and maximum hour legislation in which the standard has traditionally
been embodied.” Id. at 31–32.
122. Id. at 33 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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The Dynamex court referenced the appropriateness of the economic realities standard in its expansive protection beyond the relatively restrictive common law standard and noted that a “multi-factor standard” possessed a substantial number disadvantages – “particularly in the wage and hour context.” 123
The first of these disadvantages is that the standard is inherently vague, provides little guidance to both the worker and employer, and instead utilizes criteria that result in “often considerably delayed judicial decisions.” 124 Second,
the standard incentivizes evasion of “fundamental responsibilities” by allowing
an employer to “divid[e the] workforce into disparate categories and varying
the working conditions of individual workers” so as to utilize the many circumstances which may be relevant. 125 The court noted that
a number of jurisdictions have adopted a simpler, more structured test
for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors –
the so-called “ABC” test – that minimizes these disadvantages. The
ABC test presumptively considers all workers to be employees, and permits workers to be classified as independent contractors only if the hiring business demonstrates that the worker in question satisfies each of
three conditions: (a) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both
under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and (b)
that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the
hiring entity’s business; and (c) that the worker is customarily engaged
in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the
same nature as that involved in the work performed. 126

Thus, joining Massachusetts 127 and New Jersey, 128 the Supreme Court of
California adopted the ABC test. 129 The first criterion of the ABC test is control. 130 Control is a longstanding requirement that was present in the common
law definition of employee as well as the more recent NLRA decisions. 131 The
second criterion is that the work that is done must be “clearly comparable” to
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. (alteration in original). See generally Anna Deknatel & Lauren HoffDowning, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent
Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53 (2015)
(evaluating the many state jurisdictions have a place for a common law test with more
simplified standards, which allow for less evasion than the common law test that was
substituted for Hearst).
127. See Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 680 (Mass. 2018). Cf. Fleece on
Earth v. Departments of Employment and Training, 181 Vt. 458, 464 (2007).
128. See Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 463 (N.J. 2015).
129. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 35.
130. Id. at 36.
131. Id; see, e.g., Crew One Prods., Inc. v. NLRB., 811 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir.
2016).
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the work done in the ordinary course of business. 132 This replicates the approach taken by the courts in employment cases transcending the independent
contractor-employee scenario, where the employer seeks to subordinate a second group of workers, hired on, for instance, on an annual renewal basis, with
both groups performing the same task or functions. 133 The third criterion
– “that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the
hiring entity” – is the most straightforward. 134 For example, if the worker is a
plumber and working for another plumber or an employer who conducts a separate business, then this third criterion would be satisfied. 135
The significance of Dynamex lies not only in its simplified approach to
making independent contractor-employee determinations but also in its requirement that the employer carry the burden with respect to each of the ABC
test’s criteria. 136 But there are also a host of unanswered questions that stem
from the Dynamex decision. The first question is whether the decision applies
retroactively. This is an issue of considerable consequence given the damages
liability that would flow from retroactivity. 137 If the decision applies retroactively, defendants might argue that they relied upon other pro-employer criteria
in good faith to side-step liability. 138
The second and more basic question is whether and to what extent the
court’s holding in Dynamex applies to other employment controversies beyond
the wage order context. The court in Dynamex emphasized the application of
the ruling to “wage orders,” and it seems clear that the new standard would
apply to disputes about overtime and maximum hours as well as rest and meal
periods inasmuch as those were the issues presented in the case. 139 But the
court specifically did not address the question whether employees could obtain
132. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 37.
133. Id.; see, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997);

Kalksma v. Konica Minolta Bus. Sols. U.S.A., Inc., No. CIV. 10-2829 DRD, 2011 WL
3703471 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2011); Oplchenski v. Parfums Givenchy, Inc., No. 05 CV
6105, 2009 WL 440959 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009); Contracts – Independent Contractor
Agreements – Ninth Circuit Finds That Misclassified Employees Are Eligible for Federally Regulated Employee Benefits, 111 HARV. L. REV. 609 (1997).
134. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 8.
135. Id. at 38–39.
136. Id. at 35.
137. See Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal.3d 973, 978 (2002) (“The general rule that judicial decisions are given retroactive effect is basic in our legal tradition”). Orange County Superior Court in California has also ruled Dynamex applies
retroactively. Johnson v. VCG-IS, LLC, No. 30-2015-00802813 (Cal. Sup. Ct. July 25,
2018) (deciding to apply the ABC test from Dynamex because the Court did not give
directions to depart from the general rule that court decisions will apply to retroactive
and pending cases).
138. William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Comment, Compelled Subsidies and the
First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171, 203 (2018) (concluding that the good faith
exception to retroactivity is substantially circumscribed).
139. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 5, 14.
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reimbursement for expenses incurred, as that issue was not put forward. 140
Moreover, the question of whether the standard applies in workers’ compensation and in Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) 141 actions remains to be
resolved. Unless there is another basis for declining to extend Dynamex to
other employment scenarios, the ABC test should apply in the interest of uniformity and the need for employers to conduct business under one standard.
Litigation has been commenced in the wake of the case. 142 Presumably,
criterion A will likely be the easiest factor for the courts to apply. Borello held
that “[t]he principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person
to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of
accomplishing the result desired,” 143 and the Dynamex decision appears to retain control as critical. 144
Criterion B will likely be the most difficult factor for the courts to apply.
This is because determining whether a job constitutes “same business” or
“comparable work” may be more difficult for courts to quantify. For example,
consider a plumber or electrician who is hired at one particular outlet where
such workers are not considered employees but another who is considered employed elsewhere.
Criterion C will not be entirely without its difficulties either. For instance,
courts will be asked to determine the extent to which an independent tradesperson must be informally established as an independent enterprise. In making
such a determination, courts must consider whether the tradesperson’s business
must be incorporated and whether there is a threshold advertising requirement
associated with independent contractor status. In addition, the court may be
asked to answer complex, context-specific questions. For example, if a retired
electrician does work for an employer, would that retired electrician be deemed
an independent contractor within the meaning of criterion C?
140. Id. at 7 n.5. Subsequently, some courts have assumed that Dynamex does not
apply to expense reimbursement. Garcia v. Border Transp. Grp., LLC, 2239 Cal. Rptr.
3d 360, 370–71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); Rosset v. Hunter Eng’g Co., No. A148819, 2018
WL 4659498, at *3 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2018); Salgado v. Daily Breeze, No.
B269302, 2018 WL 2714766, at *15 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2018); Karl v. Zimmer
Biomet Holdings, Inc., No. C 18–04176, 2018 WL 5809428, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
6, 2018); Alvarez v. XPO Logistics Cartage LLC, No.: CV 18–03736, 2018 WL
6271965, *4, *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018). But see Estrada v. FedEx Ground Packages
Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (providing for expense reimbursement).
141. Private Attorney General Act of 2004, 2003 Cal. Leg. Serv. ch. 906 (codified
as amended CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699 (West 2018)).
142. See, e.g., Goro v. Flowers Foods, Inc., No. 17-CV-02580-JLS-JLB, 2018 WL
3956018, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2018); Brown v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., No. 09CV-03339-EJD, 2018 WL 3417483, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2018); Curry v. Equilon
Enters., LLC, 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 312 (Ct. App. 2018).
143. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 403–04
(Cal. 1989) (citations omitted).
144. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 36.
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On the face of it, criterion B is the factor that should prove most troublesome for employers who seek to show that workers maintained skills and experience that are not comparable to the skills and experience of the employees
in their respective workforce. Another issue may arise if the employer seeks
to establish the independent contractor category by contracting work out to
other employers and promoting a kind of “fissurization” – i.e., the breakup of
tasks and functions of work previously performed by others. 145
There are uncertainties about the viability of Dynamex and its adoption of
the ABC test as it relates to trucking. 146 These cases are triggered by the
preemption issue, which arises by virtue of the confluence of Article VI and
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution – the Supremacy Clause and the
Commerce Clause. These clauses provide for the dominance of federal law
over state law on the ground that Congress has intended to displace the latter.
The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”) 147
was enacted in 1994 to guard against backdoor attacks on the policies of deregulation enacted by Congress in the 1980s, which were designed to “ensure
that the trucking industry would be shaped by competitive market forces
against a backdrop of uniform federal regulation.” 148 As a way of “complet[ing] deregulation of the trucking industry,” Congress placed a preemption
provision in the FAAAA, providing that states cannot enforce laws “relat[ing]
to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.” 149

145. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR
SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 99–101 (2014). Weil was the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division at the Department of Labor under the
Obama Administration. Weil was also the Peter and Deborah Wexler Professor of
Management at Boston University Questrom School of Business until he became the
Dean of the Heller School of Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University in
2017.
146. The deregulation of the trucking industry culminated in the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793. For an examination of practices and policies antedating the deregulation era, see e.g., American Trucking Ass’ns
v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 307 (1953); J. B. GILLINGHAM, THE TEAMSTERS UNION
ON THE WEST COAST 35–36 (1956). See generally MICHAEL H. BELZER, SWEATSHOPS
ON WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN TRUCKING DEREGULATION (2000); ESTELLE
JAMES & RALPH C. JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERS: A STUDY OF UNION POWER
(1965); VISCELLI, supra note 73.
147. Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103305, 108 Stat. 1569 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
148. Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045, 1050–51 (7th Cir. 2016); see also
FAAA Preemption: Clarifying the Law to Reestablish Congress’ Original Intent,
https://www.trucking.org/F4A%20Advocacy/F4A%20Preemption%20Overveiw.pdf
(last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
149. Costello, 810 F.3d at 1051; Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
559 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2018).
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In Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 150 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit stated that “[e]xactly where the boundary lies between permissible and impermissible state regulation is not entirely clear.” 151
In Schwann, the First Circuit was asked to determine whether individuals who
contracted with FedEx as pick-up and delivery drivers should have been classified as employees – and therefore should have reaped the financial benefits
of employee status, such as reimbursement of business expenses – rather than
independent contractors according to the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute – a statute that adhered to the ABC test. 152 The drivers argued that,
under Massachusetts law, they should have been considered employees because FedEx could not satisfy criterion B – dealing with whether “the service
is performed outside the usual course of business.” 153
With respect to the court’s analysis of criterion B, it noted that “the decision whether to provide a service directly, with one’s own employee, or to procure the services of an independent contractor is a significant decision in designing and running a business.” 154 The First Circuit concluded that because
criterion B would mandate reimbursement for business expenses, “[t]he logical
effect of [Massachusetts statute] would thus preclude FedEx from providing
for first-and-last mile pick-up and delivery services through an independent
person who bears the economic risk associated with any inefficiencies in performance” because the requirement of reimbursement would indirectly dictate
a change in its method of doing business. 155 According to the court, this was
inconsistent with the savings for employers contemplated by the deregulation
approach. 156 Accordingly, the Massachusetts statute was deemed to be
preempted and thus unconstitutional. 157
But in Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the same could be said of any state legislation
affecting employee rights. 158 For instance, minimum wage legislation could,
in some circumstances, constrain an employer’s ability to render a service in
precisely the same manner as it had previously. In Dilts, the Ninth Circuit
addressed the question of whether the Supreme Court of California’s affirmance of an employer obligation to provide a meal break of thirty minutes for
workdays exceeding five hours and an additional meal break of thirty minutes
for workdays exceeding ten hours “related to” the employer’s provision of
150.
151.
152.
153.

813 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 2016).
Id. at 437.
Id. at 432; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148B(a).
Costello, 813 F.3d at 433–34. The drivers also claimed that FedEx could not
satisfy criterion C – dealing with whether the individual is engaged in an independent
business that is “of the same nature as that involved in the service performed.” Id.
154. Id. at 438.
155. Id. at 439.
156. Id. at 439–40.
157. Id. at 432.
158. 769 F.3d 637, 648 (9th Cir. 2014).
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routes or services. 159 The court held that no preemption was triggered by the
meal and rest break statutes because such statutes “do not set prices, mandate
or prohibit certain routes, or tell motor carriers what services they may or may
not provide, either directly or indirectly.” 160 The Ninth Circuit was most persuaded by the fact that the
carriers [would] have to take into account meal and rest [period] requirements when allocating resources and scheduling routes – just as
they must take into account state wage laws, . . . or speed limits, and
weight restrictions . . . – the laws do not ‘bind’ motor carriers to specific
prices, routes or services . . . . 161

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Costello v. Beavex, Inc. 162 The Costello case involved an Illinois
statute that provided for the complete and timely payment of wages without
retaliation. 163 The Seventh Circuit held that criterion B itself, in contrast to the
conclusion reached by the First Circuit in Schwann, was not preempted because
“virtually any state law, at some level, has an effect on the market price[,] . . .
[such as] minimum wage laws, worker-safety laws, anti-discrimination laws,
and pension regulations[, which all] affect the cost of labor, and in turn, the
price at which a motor carrier offers a service.” 164
The Seventh Circuit further noted that the appropriate question should be
whether “the cost of labor is too tenuous, remote or peripheral to have a significant impact on . . . setting of prices . . . .” 165 The thrust of the First Circuit’s
position in Schwann, on the other hand, was to declare virtually all state labor
laws unconstitutional on the ground that they affect price and service, 166 which
is a position that is surely inconsistent with the promotion of the collective
bargaining process itself. 167 The better view is that held by both the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits, which allows for accommodation between deregulation and
collective bargaining.
In 2018, the Ninth Circuit held that independent contractor-employee regulation under the standards set forth in Borello (referenced in Dynamex) was

159. Id. at 640–41. The Supreme Court of California had affirmed this principle in
Brinker Restaurant v. Superior Court. Id. at 642 (citing 273 P.3d 513 (2012)).
160. Id. at 647.
161. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 660 F.3d 384, 397 (9th Cir. 2011)).
162. 810 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 2016).
163. Id. at 1050.
164. Id. at 1053 (citations omitted) (quoting S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transp.
Corp. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 544, 558 (7th Cir. 2012)).
165. Id. at 1055.
166. Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 813 F.3d 429, 436 (1st Cir.
2016).
167. See generally 29 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2018).
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not preempted. 168 But the court suggested that its reasoning was predicated
upon the fact that the “. . . standard is neither mechanical nor inflexible; different cases can do demand focus on different factors.” 169 It stressed the point
that Borello – not Dynamex itself – was at issue and that Dynamex “. . . did not
purport to replace the Borello standard in every instance where a worker must
be classified as either an independent contractor or an employee for purposes
of enforcing California’s labor protections.” 170 The unanimous panel ruling
sounded a warning that its prior decisions had deemed legislation compelling
uniform standards inconsistent with preemptive dictates of the FAAAA. 171
The road to state trucking regulation of independent contractor misclassifications may be a difficult one.
Like all labor protections, Dynamex will cost employers more money and
require either corporate savings, diminished profit margin, or increased prices.
Realistically, the Dynamex decision promotes the dignity of workers who desire both flexibility, which can be properly afforded to employees themselves,
and the reduction of inequality that so often accompanies the independent contractor status.
But there are more troubles ahead; the most prominent of them being the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems, which could completely eviscerate Dynamex through “unbargained-for” waivers of the right to
bring class actions.

2. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
The most formidable obstacle to the success of the Dynamex decision may
lie in the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Epic Systems Corp. v.
Lewis 172 – a case that will undercut the rights of workers through employerpromulgated and employer-imposed binding dispute resolution systems, 173
notwithstanding the consequences of the holding in Dynamex. In Epic Systems,
several employees filed a class action lawsuit in federal court, alleging that
their employer violated FLSA and related state law. 174 Under the NLRA, employees are afforded the right to protest together and engage in concerted activity. 175 However, despite this NLRA protection, a 5-4 majority of the Court

168. Ca. Trucking Ass’n v. Su, 903 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2018).
169. Id. at 959.
170. Id. at 967 n.4.
171. See, e.g., Californians For Safe & Competitive Dump Truck Transp. v. Men-

donca, 152 F.3d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1998). The Dynamex preemption issue appears
to be directly presented by Western States Trucking Ass’n v. Andre Schoorl, No. 2:18cv-01989, 2018 WL 5920148 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2018).
172. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1620.
175. See id. at 1628 (citing NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962)).
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held that the FAA 176 forbade the employees from pursuing such litigation because they had entered into an agreement, required as a condition of employment, with the employer that provided for “individual” arbitration to resolve
all employments disputes and prohibited class actions in court or arbitration. 177
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, writing for the majority, held that (1) the NLRA
protection of concerted activity did not cover protests involving class actions
and (2) the FAA was instructive to federal courts regarding the enforcement of
such arbitration agreements. 178 In so holding, Justice Gorsuch reasoned that,
notwithstanding the fact that the NLRA provides employees the “rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, . . . [the NLRA] says nothing about
how judges and arbitrators must try legal disputes that leave the workplace and
enter the courtroom or arbitral forum.” 179 The Court held that the focus of the
NLRA was upon the right to organize unions and to bargain collectively. 180
The Court also noted that “[u]nion organization and collective bargaining in
the workplace are the bread and butter of the NLRA, while the particulars of
dispute resolution procedures” are found elsewhere. 181 But collective protest
over working conditions is the bread and butter of the NLRA as well. The
practical significance of this protest is to protect employees against discipline
and discharge when they work together and speak out over conditions, such as
the rate of wages or other conditions of employment, that they deem to be unfair or inequitable.
The Court emphasized its precedent regarding the FAA that allowed these
individualized proceedings to prevail over NLRA protections. 182 The Court in
Epic Systems remained deliberately deaf to the realities of workplace litigation. 183
Justice Ginsburg dissented persuasively on behalf of three other members
of the Court: Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan. 184 Her dissent constituted a vigorous, frontal attack on the
class action waiver that gave rise to the litigation. Justice Ginsburg noted that
the “claims [involving minimum wage and maximum hour alleged violations
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2018).
Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1630.
Id. at 1627.
See id. at 1621–22 (citing Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228,
233 (2013) and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)); see
also William B. Gould IV, The Supreme Court, Job Discrimination, Affirmative Action,
Globalization, and Class Actions: Justice Ginsburg’s Term, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 371,
391–96 (2014).
183. This was notwithstanding the argument made that individual claims could not
be pursued on an individual basis because of cost ineffectiveness as it would
cost more to litigate than could be obtained from the relief itself. See Epic Sys. Corp.,
138 S. Ct. at 1622–23.
184. See id. at 1633–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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of the FLSA] . . . [we]re small, scarcely of a size warranting the expense of
seeking redress alone.” 185 Justice Ginsburg said, “For workers striving to gain
from their employers decent terms and conditions of employment, there is
strength in numbers. A single employee, Congress understood, is disarmed in
dealing with an employer.” 186
Her dissent explained the basis for the rise of labor legislation in the
1930s, which was designed to end inequality between the worker and the employer. 187 It highlighted the fact that the FAA used by the majority required
plaintiffs to proceed one by one. 188 The FAA was used by the majority, over
the objections of the dissent, to allow for a take-it-or-leave-it arbitration, including the collective litigation abstinence demanded therein. 189 Justice Ginsburg emphasized that employees could only effectively tackle working conditions that labor law regards as inequitable and unacceptable by banding together to protest through litigation and other means. 190 It was wrong, said the
dissent, for the majority to subordinate the NLRA and its relevant right to engage in “concerted activities”; 191 however, this was a point the majority in Epic
Systems virtually ignored.
The dissent also addressed the point that arbitration provisions of this kind
are unrelated to employment contracts and opined that “in relatively recent
years, the Court’s Arbitration Act decisions have taken many wrong turns.” 192
Justice Ginsburg maintained that the dynamics of the arbitration provision imbalance create a scenario wherein employers can risk violations of employment
law statutes while knowing that workers in most instances are not in a position
to protest because they could not do so collectively. 193 Beyond what was explicitly stated in the dissent, class actions are also important because they provide for enforcement of employment law through the “private attorney general”
when government enforcement is ineffectual due to inadequate funding, inertia, or hostility. 194
And the ramifications of this power imbalance are even deeper than what
Justice Ginsburg set forth. For example, when the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas
hearings took place in the spring of 1991, Justice Clarence Thomas was being
185.
186.
187.
188.

(2011).

Id. at 1633.
Id.
Id. at 1634–35.
Id. at 1645–48; see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350

189. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1623 (majority opinion); id. at 1642–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1645.
193. Id. at 1646–48.
194. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968) (discussing bringing a suit under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the plaintiff acts
“not [only] for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general’ vindicating a policy
that Congress considered of the highest priority”).
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confirmed as a member of the United States Supreme Court. 195 Ms. Hill was
repeatedly interrogated about sexual harassment allegations that she made
against Justice Thomas and was also asked why she had not filed an unlawful
employment practice charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 196 In my judgment, the reason Ms. Hill did not file such a charge is
likely because a remedy could not be obtained for a violation beyond a mere
cease-and-desist requirement unless a demotion, re-assignment, or dismissal
was involved.
This reality helped build momentum for the civil rights movement in 1991
and culminated in an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 197
which provided greater damage recovery that went above and beyond the traditional back pay employment remedy for sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims, such as compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. 198 The availability of such relief, alongside the common law
wrongful discharge actions that had emerged in many states during the 1980s,
created significant liability for employers and increased their desire to be immunized from such exposure. 199
The answer for employers wanting to limit their liability was the employer’s adoption of arbitration clauses – or, in the words of Justice Ginsburg,
“unbargained-for” contracts. 200 Employers promulgated unlawful discharge
procedures to shield themselves from juries – a forum that employers deem
inhospitable. 201 The reality of the workplace relationship and the significance
of the Court’s holding in Epic Systems for employer-employee disputes is wellchronicled in Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion. 202 But the need to fill in
the gap, as illustrated by Ms. Hill’s testimony, was not explicitly referenced in
the 1991 amendment. 203
At least two other issues of importance are raised by the Epic Systems
decision. The first is that is it unclear whether Epic Systems endorses the view
that arbitration agreements are categorically enforceable as a matter of public
policy. For example, the plaintiffs in O’Connor v. Uber 204 maintained that
195. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 383 (5th ed.

2013).

196. See Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It?: The “Unwelcome” Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1559 n.8 (1992).
197. Marcia D. Greenberger, What Anita Hill Did for America, CNN (Oct. 22,
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/10/21/greenberger.anita.hill/index.html;
see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat 1071 (codified as amended
by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018)).
198. Id. § 1981a.
199. See GOULD, supra note 195, at 420–28.
200. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1648–49 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
201. See id. at 1647 n.15.
202. See id. at 1646–49.
203. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
204. 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

29

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 9

1018

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

class certification of drivers who have opted out of arbitration or ended their
work prior to the implementation of an arbitration clause may be appropriate
prior to the determination of the enforceability of the clause with regards to
those who had accepted it. 205 Uber maintained that Dynamex has no applicability to that litigation because the O’Connor case did not involve a wage order
but rather another provision of the California Labor Code – an issue which will
come back to the Supreme Court of California in the future. 206 Class action
determinations could still sweep in those who have not signed an arbitration
agreement with those who have, thus enhancing the leverage of both groups.
The second is that the FAA at issue in Epic Systems does not apply to
transportation employees. 207 But this is limited in scope. In the first place, the
narrower pre-New Deal reliance upon commerce excludes a narrow band of
transportation workers from the clutches of Epic Systems. 208 The worker, rather than products or goods handled, must himself or herself be in interstate
commerce. 209 Are independent contractors and employees covered by the
transportation exemption? The United States Supreme Court, in New Prime,
Inc. v. Oliveira, 210 has held that both groups are covered by the exemption.
The Court stated:

205. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 2 n.4, O’Connor v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV 13-3826-EMC), 2015 WL
12777254. A number of courts have adopted this approach. See id. (listing eight court
decisions).
206. Defendant Uber Techs., Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 11–12 n.3, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. CV 13-3826-EMC).
207. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1644 (2018). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that Epic Systems eliminates plaintiffs’ claims
in O’Connor. “Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems, we obtained
supplemental briefings from the parties. Plaintiffs acknowledged that the Court’s decision extinguished their argument that the arbitration agreements were not enforceable
under the NLRA.” O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1094 n.3 (9th Cir.
2018).
208. Section 1 of the FAA states that “nothing herein shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). Therefore, transportation is part
of the FAA §1 exemption.
209. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the United States Supreme Court stated,
When the FAA was enacted in 1925 . . . the phrase “engaged in commerce” was
not a term of art indicating a limited assertion of congressional jurisdiction; to
the contrary, it is said, the formulation came close to expressing the outer limits
of Congress’ power as then understood . . . . Were this mode of interpretation
to prevail, we would take into account the scope of the Commerce Clause, as
then elaborated by the Court, at the date of the FAA's enactment in order to
interpret what the statute means now.

532 U.S. 105, 116 (2001) (citations omitted).
210. 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).
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[In 1925] . . . most people then would have understood §1 to exclude
not only agreements between employers and employees but also agreements that require independent contractors to perform work.
. . . This Court’s early 20th-century cases used the phrase ‘contract of
employment’ to describe work agreements involving independent contractors . . . .
. . . [T]he evidence before us remains that, as dominantly understood
in 1925, a contract of employment did not necessarily imply the existence of an employer-employee or master-servant relationship. 211
Accordingly, such truckers, so frequently characterized as independent contractors in the deregulation era, now have the right to sue for employment contract
violations in federal courts of general jurisdiction, notwithstanding the Epic Systems holding. 212 Oliveira makes it clear that some transportation workers, in-

cluding independent contractors, are not swept up by the Epic Systems pronouncements.
This ruling will have a major impact upon the gig economy, given the
large number of transportation employees who are located within it. It could
touch upon both the FAA coverage of transportation and its workers who are
admittedly independent contractors or characterized as such.
In addition to Oliviera, another possible Epic Systems escape route has
been adumbrated in California challenges to the Uber-independent contractor
classification under the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), which
protects a competitor who has been injured by unlawful or unfair conduct.
Here, plaintiffs have taken the position that their employment of drivers as employees performing the same tasks as Uber’s independent contractors at inferior wages has placed plaintiffs at a competitive disadvantage. 213 This gets at
the same problem from which workers sought relief in Epic Systems – but in
the form of a competitor’s action based upon unfair competition. 214

211. Id. at 539–40, 542 (alteration in original).
212. The Court in Oliveira did not address state arbitration laws, though it is possi-

ble that they may be preempted. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
213. Class Action Complaint for Violation of the California Unfair Competition
Law and the California Unfair Practices Act, Diva Limousine Ltd. v. Uber Techs., Inc.
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-05546-EMC).
214. The Complaint emphasizes the fact that Uber has hemorrhaged money mounting into considerable losses but that this has not dissuaded investors who expect returns
when the TNC competitors are eliminated by virtue of the above referenced practices.
Id.
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3. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle
The third area, which involves an entirely different approach undertaken
by local government, has accepted the assertion by employers that drivers in
the ridesharing and taxicab industries are independent contractors and therefore
states and local governments have jurisdiction to enact collective bargaining
legislation. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle 215 involved comprehensive legislation enacted in the form of an ordinance by the City of Seattle that
provided a collective bargaining process for for-hire vehicles and taxis, some
of which operate through platforms like Uber and Lyft. 216 Seattle is the first
city to have enacted this kind of legislation. 217 The ordinance
cover[ed] any company that sells a ride, whether it be through an app[lication (“app”)], a dispatch, curb calling, hailing on the street, or a flat
rate. It was enacted on December 14, 2015, by the Seattle City Council.
[Because the City of Seattle realized that] the unilateral imposition of
contracts upon drivers as well as unilateral changes in their wages and
working conditions could ‘adversely impact the ability of a for-hire
driver to provide transportation services in a safe, reliable, stable, costeffective and economically viable manner,’ Seattle . . . provided these
drivers with an opportunity for union representation and collective bargaining . . . . 218
. . . The ordinance also provide[d] that, in the seeking of representation,
the union is entitled to obtain from the “driver coordinators” the names,
contact information, and license numbers of drivers so that the union
can solicit their interest and obtain, if possible, majority support for the
purpose of bargaining . . . . [The ordinance further provided that, i]n the
event that the parties are unsuccessful at negotiating a collective bargaining agreement, either side may initiate arbitration of their differences, which has a binding effect, so long as local government approval
of the award is obtained. 219

The Chamber of Commerce challenged the lawfulness of the ordinance
on both federal antitrust and labor law grounds. 220 The Chamber argued that
the ordinance violated § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”) because it sanctioned “price-fixing of ride-referral service fees by private cartels
of independent-contractor drivers.” 221 The Chamber further argued that the

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 775.
Id.
Gould, supra note 66, at 123 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 123–24 (footnotes omitted).
Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 775.
Id.
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ordinance was preempted by both the Sherman Act and the NLRA. 222 The
district court found that neither the Sherman Act – by reason of the state-action
immunity doctrine – nor the NLRA preempted the ordinance, and the Chamber
appealed. 223
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, proceeding upon the
assumption that the ordinance would authorize a per se antitrust violation, reversed the district court’s dismissal of the antitrust claim under the state-action
immunity doctrine first announced by the United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown. 224 In Parker, as the Ninth Circuit noted, the Court held that
Congress did not intend to restrict the sovereign capacity of states to regulate
their economies and further held that the Sherman Act “should not be read to
bar [s]tates from imposing market restraints ‘as an act of government.’” 225 The
Ninth Circuit echoed what it characterized as the United States Supreme
Court’s disfavor of such immunity by stating, “State-action immunity is the
exception rather than the rule.” 226
The Ninth Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court “uses a
two-part test” to determine whether exemption from antitrust liability can be
established: “[F]irst, the challenged restraint [must] be one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and second, “the policy [must] be
actively supervised by the [s]tate.’” 227
With respect to the first prong of the test, the Ninth Circuit stated that
“[t]he state’s authorization must be plain and clear . . . .” 228 The displacement
of competition through a regulatory structure is the policy that a state must
clearly articulate. 229 The Ninth Circuit, by a unanimous three-judge panel, held
that the first prong – the clear articulation requirement – had not been satisfied
in Chamber of Commerce because, given that the ridesharing industry was not

222. Id. at 779 (citing Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1959)). See generally William B. Gould, The Garmon Case: Decline and
Threshold of “Litigating Elucidation”, 39 U. DETROIT L.J. 539 (1962).
223. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 776.
224. Id. at 781 (citing 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
225. Id. (quoting FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 224
(2013)). “Following Parker, the [United States] Supreme Court has, ‘under certain
circumstances,’ extended immunity from federal antitrust laws to ‘nonstate actors carrying out the State’s regulatory program.’” Id. (quoting Phoebe Putney Health Sys.,
Inc., 568 U.S. at 224–25).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 782 (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)). This “two-part test [is] sometimes referred to as the
Midcal test.” Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 782–83 (citing S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,
471 U.S. 48, 64 (1985)).
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yet in existence, it could not be said that the Washington legislature contemplated the for-hire drivers to “price fix” their compensation. 230 In reaching this
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found that the legislature, in focusing upon privately operated transportation services, was not concerned with “the contractual payment arrangements between for-hire drivers and driver coordinators
for use of the latter’s smartphone apps or ride-referral services.” 231 This reasoning that emphasizes statutory construction has persuaded no other tribunal
in the United States or in Europe confronted with a similar issue. 232 The court,
in arriving at its conclusion that the clear articulation requirement had not been
satisfied, stated,
Although driver coordinators like Uber and Lyft contract with providers
of transportation services, they do not fulfill the requests for transportation services – the drivers do. Nothing in the statute evinces a clearly
articulated state policy to displace competition in the market for ridereferral service fees charged by companies like Uber, Lyft, and
Eastside. In other words, although the statute addresses the provision
of transportation services, it is silent on the issue of compensation contracts between for-hire drivers and driver coordinators.
....
. . . [A]lthough the State of Washington authorized municipalities to
regulate the for-hire transportation services industry at large, the statutes do not indicate that the state adopted a policy authorizing for-hire
drivers to fix the rates Uber and Lyft charge for use of their ride-referral
apps. 233

This theme pervades the Ninth Circuit’s opinion on the clearly articulated
prong of the Parker state sovereignty test. Simply, the Ninth Circuit noted that
Uber and Lyft were not in existence when the Washington statute was enacted. 234 But the court noted that “the fact that technology has advanced leaps
and bounds beyond the contemplation of the state legislature is not, on its own,
the dispositive factor in our holding today.” 235 Modern technological advances
may not have been a dispositive factor in the court’s defense of its own opinion;
yet, when one looks at the totality of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, it appears

230. Id. at 783.
231. Id. at 784.
232. See, e.g., Case C-320/16, Uber France SAS v. Bensalem (Apr. 10, 2018),

http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=192325&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1610202; The British
Council v. Jeffrey [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2253 (Eng.).
233. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 784–86.
234. Id. at 787.
235. Id.
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that, to paraphrase Shakespeare, “[t]he lady doth protest too much, methinks.” 236
The court held that the second prong – the active supervision requirement
– was also not satisfied in Chamber of Commerce because active supervision
had to exist at the state level rather than the municipal level. 237 Therefore,
because the Seattle ordinance only possessed active supervision at the municipal level, the court held the active supervision requirement was not met. 238 The
Ninth Circuit stated, “Sovereign capacity matters.” 239 Moreover, in the court’s
view, because private parties had “substantial discretion” in setting the terms
of municipal regulation, the act of state supervision must be shown in the circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that no agreement could be entered into
– let alone certified – without the City of Seattle’s approval. 240
The soundest portion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion lies in its handling of
the preemption issue. The district court held that the congressional decision to
exclude independent contractors did not “implicitly” preempt state or local labor regulation of independent contractors. 241 The Ninth Circuit, like the district court, relied on the cases holding that the exclusion of farm workers 242 and
domestic employees 243 from federal law allowed for state regulation and noted
that the preemption of state legislation relating to supervisors was predicated
upon the peculiar NLRA language relating to them. 244 Accordingly, the court
rejected the Chamber’s contention that the ordinance was preempted under Machinists preemption 245 because, given the explicit instruction to exclude inde-

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2.
Id. at 789–90.
Id.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 791, 793.
Id. at 793; see also Villegas v. Princeton Farms, Inc., 893 F.2d 919, 921 (7th
Cir. 1990); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Jones, 430 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Minn. 1977)
(“[T]here is no legislative history to indicate that the NLRA’s exclusion of agricultural
laborers from its coverage was intended to leave the area totally free from regulation
and because that exclusion standing alone is to be understood to mean that federal policy is indifferent, . . . the court has concluded that state regulation has not been
preempted . . . .”). See generally William B. Gould IV, Some Reflections on Contemporary Issues in California Farm Labor, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1243, 1271–72 (2017)
(discussing the coverage of agricultural laborers). “[S]tates remain free to legislate as
they see fit.” Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 793 (quoting United Farm Workers
of Am. v. Ariz. Agric. Emp’t Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1982)).
243. Id.; see also Greene v. Dayton, 806 F.3d. 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 2015).
244. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 793–94.
245. Id. at 790–94; see also Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). “Machinists preemption forbids both the . . .
[NLRB] and [s]tates to regulate conduct that Congress intended to be unregulated because left to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.” Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 790 (citations omitted).
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pendent contractors, “the [o]rdinance regulates economic activity that Congress intended to remain unregulated and left to the forces of the free market.” 246
The Ninth Circuit also considered whether the ordinance was preempted
under Garmon preemption but ultimately held that it was not. 247 In Garmon,
the United States Supreme Court held that if a subject matter is deemed “‘arguably’ protected or prohibited,” it is preempted. 248 The Ninth Circuit held
that Garmon preemption could be found if the NLRB could address the issue
of whether the drivers were employees in the future and rejected the Chamber’s
argument that the ordinance should be deemed preempted under Garmon until
the NLRB decides the issue. 249
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Chamber, “without citing any authority,”
claimed that there was no need for it to take a position on the status of drivers
or to provide any evidence because the proceedings before the NLRB on employee status were “ongoing” to make out preemption. 250 The Ninth Circuit
noted that one of the most instructive cases regarding the issue of preemption
is ILA v. Davis, 251 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that preemption was not established as a “conclusory assertion.” 252 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit held that, as in Davis, preemption could not be found simply because
an issue before the NLRB had not been decided by it. 253 However, the question
in Davis of whether an individual was properly excluded as a supervisor was
one exclusively of fact, whereas the independent contractor issue involving
drivers involves both a conclusion of law as well as fact. 254 The Ninth Circuit
rendered this difference between the two cases relatively meaningless, however. It stated,
Practically speaking, the question of whether drivers who contract with
Uber and Lyft are employees or independent contractors may well be a
“live issue” in other judicial and administrative proceedings involving
different parties, claims, and law. But that does not absolve the Chamber from complying with our case law regarding Garmon preemption. 255

246. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 791.
247. Id. at 794–95; see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236

(1959).

248. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 794 (quoting Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n
v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 394 (1986)).
249. Id. at 795.
250. Id.
251. 476 U.S. 380.
252. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 794 (quoting Davis, 476 U.S. at 394).
253. Id. at 795.
254. Gould, supra note 66, at 138–39.
255. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 795.
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One difficulty with the employers’ position under Garmon, while arguing
for preemption at the local level, was that in asserting its position before the
NLRB, the employers were arguing two positions inconsistent with one another, depending upon the forum. The last thing that employers wished to do
in Chamber of Commerce was put forward evidence showing that the drivers
were arguably employees, as a conclusion by the NLRB that the drivers were
employees would not have been desirable from the employers’ perspective.
The most important practical upshot of this aspect of Chamber of Commerce is that states willing to enact legislation providing for collective bargaining for independent contractors now have a roadmap to do so. Even though
some of the Ninth Circuit’s antitrust analysis rests on a wobbly edifice, supervision can be designated to the municipal level, though the politics of obtaining
statewide legislation would be more considerable given that the voices of antiregulation are louder outside the cities. Preemption, if it had been found by
the Ninth Circuit, could have put any state and local legislation out of business.
As a direct result of the Chamber of Commerce decision, states like California,
for instance, have a roadmap for how to proceed and may assert jurisdiction in
light of the preemption analysis provided in Chamber of Commerce.

IV. CONCLUSION
Dynamex is a landmark decision of considerable importance. The business community, however, may have underestimated its ace in the hole – that
is, individualized and, in Justice Ginsburg’s words, “unbargained-for” contracts that make it impossible for employees to benefit from decisions like Dynamex. True, the Court has thus far left unresolved the issue of exemption for
transportation employees in the gig economy. Are transportation employees
exempt from the Court’s unwavering promotion of employer- promulgated arbitration? Does the exemption extend to both independent contractors as well
as employees? This Article shows that two decades of FAA jurisprudence
clearly provide for the exemption. The practical significance of the exemption
would allow holdings like Dynamex to flourish – as they should – and would
provide dignity and protection for workers in the gig economy.
Finally, although Chamber of Commerce has less immediate impact than
either Dynamex or Epic Systems, the Chamber of Commerce decision sketches
an outline for any state to enact relatively comprehensive collective bargaining
legislation for the benefit of drivers whom companies claim to be independent
contractors, 256 particularly if the NLRB under President Trump’s Administra256. Some have argued that the legislative answer lies in the creation of a new or
third classification for “independent workers” in the gig economy. See SETH D. HARRIS
& ALAN B. KRUEGER, HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR
LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 5 (2015),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf. But the better view is
that articulated by Professors Miriam Cherry and Antonio Alosi who have persuasively
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tion adopts the employer position and characterizes such drivers as independent contractors. 257 Perhaps an intermediate compromise would allow, as in
Denmark, for the workers to choose their status at a particular time. 258 The
ultimate irony could be that the Chamber of Commerce decision adds to the
cause of reformers who seek to bring the rights of labor to state government –
rights that are so often excluded by the doctrine of preemption.

argued that a third category should not be created given the inevitable litigation about
these boundaries and given the fact that doing so would “result in downgrading employees to intermediate status, [which] would do nothing to eliminate the problem of
bogus contractor status.” Miriam A. Cherry and Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 678
(2017).
257. Cf. William B. Gould IV, Politics and the Effect on the National Labor Relations Board’s Adjudicative and Rulemaking Processes, 64 EMORY L.J. 1501, 1526
(2015) (“The amount and extent of political interference has increased substantially
since the 1990s and promises to do so again given the composition of Congress in 2015
and beyond. Congress, now encouraged and prompted by the Congressional Review
Act, seems now to be almost obsessed with the view that it is the expert, not the
[NLRB], and that its role is to instruct the [NLRB] about what to do.” (footnote omitted)).
258. Sarah O’Connor, Uber and Lyft’s Valuations Expose the Gig Economy to
Scrutiny, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/49650d320c48-11e9-acdc-4d9976f1533b (“There is a way out. Last year, a Danish gig economy
company called Hilfr, which sends cleaners to private homes, signed an innovative collective agreement with the 3F union. After 100 hours of work on the app, Hilfr workers
become covered automatically by the agreement, which gives them a minimum wage,
sick pay and pension contributions. If they prefer, workers can opt out and continue to
work as freelancers. This solution might not be directly transferrable to other [labor]
markets. But it is a reminder that the benefits delivered by gig companies – speed,
flexibility, transparency – are not incompatible with giving workers employment protections.”).
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